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Abstract
How can a critical analysis of entrepreneurial intention inform an appreciation of ethics in social enterprise business models? 
In answering this question, we consider the ethical commitments that inform entrepreneurial action (inputs) and the hybrid 
organisations that emerge out of these commitments and actions (outputs). Ethical theory can be a useful way to reorient 
the ield of social enterprise so that it is more critical of bureaucratic (charitable) and market-driven (business) enterprises 
connected to neoliberal doctrine. Social enterprise hybrid business models are therefore reframed as outcomes of both 
ethical and entrepreneurial intentions. We challenge the dominant conceptualisation of social enterprise as a hybrid blend 
of mission and market (purpose-versus-resource) by reframing hybridity in terms of the moral choice of economic system 
(redistribution, reciprocity and market) and social value orientation (personal, mutual or public beneit). We deconstruct 
the political foundations of charitable trading activities, co-operative and mutual enterprises and socially responsible busi-
nesses by examining the rationalities (formal, social and substantive) and ethical commitments (utilitarian, communitarian, 
pragmatic) that underpin them. Whilst conceptual modelling of social enterprise is not new, this paper contributes to knowl-
edge by developing a theory of social enterprise ethics based on the moral/political choices that are made by entrepreneurs 
(knowingly and unknowingly) when choosing between systems of economic exchange and social value orientation, then 
expressing it through a legal form.
Keywords Social enterprise · Hybridity · Business ethics · Trading charities · Social businesses · Co-operatives · 
Utilitarianism · Communitarianism · Pragmatism
Introduction
Whilst there appears to be broad support for integrating ethi-
cal decision-making into social enterprise (SE) governance 
systems (Ridley-Duf and Bull 2016; Spear et al. 2009) and 
developing ethical production and consumption practices 
through ‘fair trade’ business models such as Fairtrade (see 
Davies and Crane 2010; Davies et al. 2010; Doherty and 
Davies 2013; Mason and Doherty 2015), there is a void 
in the SE literature on the connection between its alleged 
hybridity and resulting business ethics. We will argue that 
this void hides the diversity of ethical, moral and political 
choices implicit in the labels applied to diferent SE busi-
ness models.
Our research question is: ‘how can a critical analysis of 
entrepreneurial intention inform an appreciation of ethics 
in social enterprise business models?’. In developing an 
answer, we problematise the connection between SE orien-
tations and the business models they create in two ways: (1) 
by challenging the dominance of the public/private (mission-
market) dichotomy and how this framing limits discussion 
of SE ethics to the integrity of ‘mission’; (2) by linking SE 
ethics to diferent motivations to create SEs, the rationali-
ties they generate and the legal forms they take. In short, we 
examine the connection between the motivations that trigger 
social entrepreneurship (ethical inputs), and the way moral 
choices regarding economic exchange, organising principles, 
legal form and social value orientation produce SEs (ethical 
outputs).
Whilst prior research has positioned SE hybrids (and 
social entrepreneurship) as a global movement building a 
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social economy distinct from the state and private sectors 
(Nicholls 2006; Pearce 2003), there remains little analysis 
within SE research to problematise its ethical commitments 
(Chell et al. 2016). As depicted in Fig. 1, we see the concep-
tion of SE as having a rhetorical front (‘trading for social 
purpose’) which is dominant in the framing of SE. However, 
behind this is a substantive ‘deep’ back with diverse politi-
cal foundations that are under-theorised in the ield. Despite 
calls to move beyond deinition (Light 2008; Mair and Marti 
2006; Nicholls 2006), we still see beneits from problema-
tising the theorisation of SE through the alternative lens of 
business ethics (Bull et al. 2010; Chell et al. 2016; Dacin 
et al. 2010, 2011; Dey and Steyaert 2016).
As Roberts (2003) sets out, it is important to distinguish 
image (rhetoric) and substance (actions). We concur with 
Daskalaki et al. (2015) that our theorising needs to move 
to investigating multidisciplinary connections that inluence 
social transformation. They call for new multi-level frame-
works. Our response is to connect entrepreneurial intentions 
to rationalities that inform organisational practices and the 
legal choices that connect these practices to distinct forms 
of SE with diferent political foundations.
Scholars in the ield already question whether ‘social 
enterprise’ is the Trojan horse for privatisation (Murdoch, 
2007), the marketisation of the social economy (Teasdale 
2012) or part of a political project to advance neoliberal-
ism into charitable and community-based enterprise (Dey 
and Steyaert 2016). Such caution is warranted. As several 
authors have claimed, we need to question the way SE is 
presented as a revision upholding the spirit of capitalism 
(Barinaga 2013; Costa and Saraiva 2012; Hjorth 2013). 
Further, Tedmanson et al. (2012) warn that entrepreneur-
ship as a ield of study has been dominated by a pro-market 
and pro-entrepreneur ideology. Consequently, we agree with 
Barinaga (2013) that we need to problematise the rationali-
ties that underpin SE, and with Hjorth (2013) that a more 
public form of entrepreneurship needs recognition in the 
SE literature. Researchers need to peel away and engage the 
paradoxes, contradictions and tensions of the entrepreneurial 
endeavour.
We will argue that behind this rhetorical front there is a 
substantive back which is given less attention. As Parker and 
Thomas (2011, p. 244) ‘what counts as critical depends on 
what counts as dominant’. The mission-market framing of 
SE is dominant. Whilst Dey and Steyaert (2010) develop a 
critical response based on ‘counter’ or ‘little’ narratives that 
ofset the dominant ‘grand’ narrative, we see a more sub-
stantive back that ofers a wider ranging, but coherent, coun-
ter perspective. Moreover, as Barinaga (2013) has pointed 
out, there is more than one social entrepreneurial rationality 
enacted through the diferent tools, strategies and methods 
of management in the case studies she observed. We agree 
that social entrepreneurial rationalities need further explora-
tion, but also that they need to be considered in light of their 
political foundations, organisational implications and legal 
expression. As Daskalaki et al. (2015) contend, new forms 
of organising and organisation represent social transforma-
tions in the way we co-constitute new social realities. We 
follow their to call to break away from individualistic capi-
talistic discourses by showing how social entrepreneurship 
also achieves social transformation through legal models that 
relect alternative political and social choices, rather than 
economic ones.
The substantive back therefore requires more explanation 
to broaden the concept of SE beyond ‘trading for social pur-
pose’. To do this, we grapple with the paradoxes, contradic-
tions and tensions in the dominant discourse.
We identify three disconnections that open up the sub-
stantive back, which require more theorising:
1. How political foundations difer across the breadth of 
SE forms;
2. How conceptualisations of SE (community interest com-
panies, trading charities, co-operatives, mutuals, com-
munity beneit societies) link political foundations to 
ethical commitments;
3. How a theory of social enterprise ethics can inform the 
development of the ield.
This critical approach, based on an alternative way of see-
ing, contributes to a more critical entrepreneurship litera-
ture (Barinaga 2013; Daskalaki et al. 2015; Hjorth 2013; 
Steyaert and Hjorth 2005). As Ogbor (2000, p. 607) argues: 
‘…deconstruction of entrepreneurial discourse enables us 
Fig. 1  Conceptualising the chal-
lenge of social enterprise ethics
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to become resistant, rather than assenting, spectators and 
readers of entrepreneurial texts. Signiicantly, it enables us 
to examine those binaries that have been supplemented and/
or silenced in the discourse on entrepreneurship’.
We explore the silences created by the dominant mission-
market discourse on SE to build on Hjorth’s (2013) argu-
ment that we need a more intensive discussion of the social, 
and Steyaert and Hjorth’s (2005) argument that we need 
a more thoughtful elaboration of the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and society. We expose the irst disconnection 
(1) by considering diferences in political, moral and ethical 
commitments that arise out of three diferent rationalities 
(formal, social and substantive). This eschews the oversim-
pliied public–private (mission-market) dichotomy in SE 
by favouring an alternative analysis based on hybridities 
that occur when moral choices are made between economic 
systems (redistribution, reciprocity and market) and social 
value orientation (personal, mutual and public beneits). As 
a result, we tackle the second disconnection (2) by reorient-
ing the ield so that it considers diferences in the ethical 
commitments that stem from charitable trading, from coop-
eration and mutuality and from socially responsible busi-
ness (Fig. 1). Speciically, we will argue that three core 
approaches to SE have an associated rationality and legal 
foundation that produces diferent ethical outcomes: hybrid 
(i) charitable trading activities (CTAs) that are inluenced by 
the formal rationality of ixed charitable or social objects; 
hybrid (ii) co-operatives and mutual enterprises (CME) are 
guided by social rationality in mutual associations and coop-
erative action, and; hybrid (iii) socially responsible busi-
nesses (SRBs) that are outcomes of social entrepreneurs’ 
substantive rationality (Ridley-Duf and Bull 2016). This 
approach enables us to tackle the inal disconnection (3) to 
frame a response to the special issue of the Journal of Busi-
ness Ethics on outstanding ethical issues in SEs (see Chell 
et al. 2016). We set out new lines to start new conversations.
Whilst wrestling with the deinitional tensions within the 
ield of SE is not new, extending the debate to rationali-
ties and ethics adds to a growing body of papers taking a 
more critical perspective. By showing that ethical commit-
ments are rooted in social and political choices that produce 
diferent types of SE, the ield can broaden its focus and 
move away from seeing management as a series of technical 
choices to a more critical understanding of the moral and 
political choices that social entrepreneurs make when they 
institutionalise their organising through their choice of legal 
form (Barinaga 2013; Wray-Bliss 2009). We contribute to 
CMS through unsettling the dominant mission-market SE 
discourse on hybridity in favour of a more nuanced analysis 
that exposes the plurality of choices available and the new 
forms of organising that actualise social transformations 
(Daskalaki et al. 2015).
To build our argument, we have divided the paper into 
four sections. In the irst section, we explore the SE literature 
with the speciic aim of critiquing and contextualising hybrid 
models to highlight the dominance of a discourse that ofers 
a choice of public, social and private enterprise. We then 
position our argument as an alternative worldview rooted in 
a choice between associative (CTAs), cooperative (CMEs) 
and responsible (SRBs) social entrepreneurship. Secondly, 
we contextualise our paper within the broader ield of busi-
ness ethics and pinpoint the gap in the literature we contrib-
ute to. This sets the scene for a section that outlines formal, 
social and substantive rationality and examines how they 
link to conceptualisations of SE. Lastly, we link our discus-
sion of ethics to a meta-theory of economic choices and 
social value orientations (based on Dreu and Boles 1998; 
Polanyi 2001) to show how the various motives to action 
(ethical inputs) produce a diversity of organising princi-
ples and outcomes (ethical outputs). In our conclusions, we 
highlight our contribution by arguing that the diversity of 
SE itself is linked to moral and political choices regarding 
economic exchange and social value creation (compare Bull 
et al. 2010).
Conceptualising Social Enterprise
At a grassroots level, SE in the UK initially gained its strong-
est foothold within the co-operative movement and commu-
nity regeneration sector (Ridley-Duf and Southcombe 2012; 
Teasdale 2012). Prior to 2001, the focus was on building 
a broad movement of employee-owned businesses (EOBs) 
and philanthropically minded community beneit societies 
funded by community share issues (Brown 2004, 2006). 
By late 1997, a coalition of co-operatives and co-operative 
development agencies had formed Social Enterprise London. 
As regional links developed, a national body—the Social 
Enterprise Coalition (SEC), was created to lobby for co-
operatives, social irms, trading charities, community and 
employee-owned businesses.
As time passed, and particularly after a UK government 
consultation involving charities and voluntary groups, the 
co-operative origins of the SE movement in the UK became 
obscured by a strengthening (US-dominated) discourse 
on earned income and innovation in charities and public 
services (Ridley-Duf 2007, 2008; Somers 2013; Teasdale 
2012). A gradual move from redistributive philanthropy 
to forms of market-action is also found in some early UK 
research (Amin et al. 1999; Westall 2001). The efect was 
to raise the proile of social businesses as a policy option 
through joint action by governments and private charita-
ble foundations or through partnerships with ‘responsible’ 
corporations.
 M. Bull, R. Ridley-Duf 
1 3
In early SE discourse, as highlighted by Pearce (2003, p. 
34), there was an underlying assumption that SE is an ethical 
activity: ‘The purpose of social enterprises is to contribute 
to the common good, to beneit society and more widely, 
the planet. Speciic objectives will it within this overarch-
ing sense of social purpose’. In 2002, the UK Government 
published its strategy for SE (DTI 2002). This outlined a 
new era and political framework for the development of SE 
in England and Wales. As part of the positioning of the sec-
tor, the strategy crafted a deinition still used widely today. It 
read: ‘A social enterprise is a business with primarily social 
objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for 
that purpose in the business or in the community, rather 
than being driven by the need to maximise proit for share-
holders and owners’. The strategy itself recognised various 
hybrid organisational forms under the SE umbrella that are 
(weakly) recognised in the oicial deinition. Likewise, there 
is no mention of ethics in either the deinition or the entire 
81-page strategy. Given the claim that ethics and morality 
are at the heart of SE (Bull et al. 2010) combined with a 
rhetorical proposition that SE is about ‘trading for a social 
purpose’ why is ethics missing from policy discussion?
The dominant discourse on SE emphasises its hybrid 
organisational form, or forms, blending mission and market 
logics that are coined variously as ‘businesses with social 
purpose’ or ‘in business for good’ (Billis 2010; Mason and 
Doherty 2015). As Defourny and Nyssens (2010, p. 44) note, 
in agreement with Pearce (2003), ‘for all schools of thought, 
the explicit aim to beneit the community or the creation 
of social value is the core mission of social entrepreneur-
ship and social enterprises’. This high moral ground was 
expressed in the irst version of the Social Enterprise Mark 
(SEM) by featuring a halo above the words ‘social enter-
prise’ (Ridley-Duf and Bull 2016).
This discourse has shaped conceptual models of SE. 
Table 1 shows theoretical framings that we have used in 
Table 1  Analysis of enterprise orientations
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both teaching and research, all of which appear unequivo-
cally as a spectrum of orientations that range from philan-
thropic to commercial enterprise. Prior to the launch of SE 
in the UK, Dees (1998) in the USA and Pestof (1998) in 
Europe were theorising a trend towards more commercial 
approaches in the non-proit sector. Pestof (1998) outlines 
European hybridity thinking and what he calls the welfare 
mix between state and enterprise orientation. He draws on 
Polanyi (2001, [1944]) to conceptualise SE as a combination 
of various actors (state, community and for-proit compa-
nies), deploying various logics of action (public, non-proit, 
private for-proit, informal and formal) to engage in diferent 
types of economic exchange (redistribution, reciprocity and 
market). Unlike ‘third sector’ conceptualisations of SE in the 
UK aligned to ‘community’, Pestof places it irmly at the 
intersections between community-based, proit-making and 
public-beneit activities.
Dees in the USA warned of the cultural challenges to 
non-proits from the operational strategies required by a 
change of enterprise orientation. Dart (2004) concurs that a 
‘business-like’ hybrid enterprise orientation modiies moral-
ity in virtuous organisations and that this results in a cultural 
shift towards a neoconservative, pro-market agenda. Dees 
(1998) visually represents three enterprise orientations: (1) 
charitable type, mission-driven, non-proit organisations; (2) 
market-driven, proit-seeking organisations; and (3) mission 
and market-driven hybrid enterprise orientation (Table 1).
Interestingly, Dees introduces the dichotomy of ‘appeal 
to goodwill’ and ‘appeal to self-interest’, which opens up the 
link between SEs and business ethics. An appeal to goodwill 
invites action that is philanthropic and redistributive, which 
we discuss later by contrasting it with an egoistic, neoliberal 
(market) orientation.
Through a comparison of Dees (1998), Hjorth (2013) and 
Laasch and Conway (2015), we can observe that a commer-
cial orientation is theorised as internal value creation (‘econ-
omising’) combined with egoism (on the right of Table 1). 
This is presented as the opposite of external value creation 
(‘socialising’) and philanthropy (on the left of Table 1).
Laasch and Conway’s model highlights the demarca-
tion between the diferent value propositions of organisa-
tions. They conceptualise (‘irresponsible business’) which 
pinpoints an internal enterprise orientation combined with 
an egocentric mission. This is aligned with Dees’s ‘purely 
commercial’ orientation. ‘Irresponsible’ business (Laasch 
and Conway 2015) might not necessarily be breaking the 
law (e.g. selling illegal substances like cocaine), but it could 
include clothing manufacturers that exploit child labour or 
retailers that avoid paying tax in countries where they trade. 
The broad generalisation that commercial businesses are 
irresponsible is treated with caution by other authors. The 
work of Wagner-Tsukamoto (2005, 2007) is subtler because 
it suggests that the outcome of market processes (consumer 
needs met, employment opportunities created, trading) 
increases living standards, which has some virtue in terms 
of a greater good for society. At level 1, Wagner-Tsukamoto 
proposes that business activity passively satisies some unin-
tentional level of moral agency by virtue of ‘doing’ business. 
Thus, the unscrupulous activities of clothing manufacturers 
using child labour in their supply chains do have some level 
of moral legitimacy and ethical capital in Wagner-Tsukamo-
to’s eyes if they are contributing to ‘rising living standards 
and rising welfare in society’ (2007, p. 210).
Laasch and Conway’s (2015) next conceptualisation 
(‘responsible business’) is taken to include those commer-
cial organisations that practice corporate social responsibil-
ity and/or address UN sustainable development goals. For 
Wagner-Tsukamoto (2007), this enterprise orientation covers 
two levels-level 2 (‘passive, intended moral agency’) and 
level 3 (‘active, intended moral agency’) (2007, p. 210). At 
level 2, there is an ethical commitment to strategically doing 
the minimum, staying within the law but not creating value 
for key shareholders beyond what Carroll (1991) refers to 
as legal and economic responsibilities. Following Friedman 
(1970), enterprise orientations observe the injunction to stay 
within the rules of the game. For the previously mentioned 
clothing manufacturers exploiting child labour, it would be 
within the ‘rules of the game’ to abide by a country’s policy 
on labour age, even if it is lower than in other parts of the 
world (see Fisher and Lovell 2006 for the case of Adidas 
Soloman). At level 3, Wagner-Tsukamoto identiies where 
stakeholder considerations are accommodated—so long as 
they do not override shareholder interests. Intended moral 
agency is played out in organisations that embrace a neolib-
eral sustainability agenda.
However, Laasch and Conway’s next conceptualisation 
(‘social enterprise’) is positioned as an enterprise orien-
tation with more of an external than internal orientation 
towards value creation and mission, going beyond the self-
interest inherent in neoliberalism. The challenge here is the 
positioning of co-operatives as SEs, because co-operatives 
might supericially display a more internal than external 
orientation, or be associated with Dees’s mission and mar-
ket ‘mixed motives’. As seen in Table 1, the positioning of 
co-operatives is, however, recognised explicitly by Conaty 
(2001), Westall (2001), Cornforth (2003), Defourny and 
Nyssens (2016) and Ridley-Duf and Bull (2016). Lastly, 
Laasch and Conway discuss philanthropic organisations 
with an external value orientation (‘business foundations’), 
similar to Dees’s ‘purely philanthropic’ type and Hjorth’s 
‘socialising’ entrepreneurship with a public ethos.
Alter (2007) makes a similar argument to Dees, Laasch 
and Conway. She positions enterprise orientations along 
a spectrum to distinguish diferent business models. She 
highlights a step change between those on both the social 
and economic value creation ends of the economy. Ethics 
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are alluded to here, inasmuch as Alter posits that socially 
responsible businesses follow sustainability strategies under 
the ideology of ‘doing well by doing good’—good taken 
to mean a public good based on utilitarian ethical reason-
ing. Bull et al. (2010) also furthered Wagner-Tsukamoto’s 
theorem by plotting a fourth and ifth level of ethical capital 
over Alter’s model. Levels 4 and 5 occur on the social value 
side of Alter’s diagram, with level 4 titled ‘intended blended 
value’ that combines ‘social’ and ‘economic’ outcomes, 
and level 5 which goes beyond balancing to give preference 
to ‘social’ outcomes. The distinction between ‘non-proit 
with income generating activities’ and ‘social enterprise’ 
in Alter’s model is interesting because it opens up space to 
consider diferent enterprise orientations in the social value 
creation side of the economy.
Conaty (2001) also notes these diferences by distinguish-
ing ‘the social enterprise way’ as ‘the ethical path between 
charity and commerce’. Conaty suggests SE hybridity ranges 
from the trading activities of charities at one end to co-
operative and mutual societies at the other. He also refers 
to the success of SE being down to 5Ms—one of which is 
moral motivation (the other four being; markets, manage-
ment, mouth and money). Just as Wagner-Tsukamoto opens 
up nuanced diferences amongst the ethical diferentiators 
of private companies, Alter, Dees and Conaty start of ofer 
evidence of ethical diferentiation between types of SE. Of 
interest here is the way Conaty draws attention to an ethi-
cal path as well as the two enterprise orientations labelled 
‘social business’ and ‘co-ops and mutuals’. If we add Alter’s 
label, we arrive at three hybrid forms of SE: (1) ‘non-proits 
with income generating activities’; (2) ‘co-ops and mutuals’, 
and; (3) ‘social businesses’.
In Bull (2015) and Ridley-Duf and Bull (2016), the 
hybrid logics of SE are explored to arrive at the same three 
forms of SE. They both frame SEs in three ways: hybrid 
(i) CTAs constituted in charity law; hybrid (ii) CMEs con-
stituted in society law; and hybrid (iii) SRBs constituted 
in company law. This aligns with the latest global research 
project (ICSEM) led by Defourny and Nyssens (2016). The 
ICSEM project also separates organisational types into dis-
tinct hybrids: (1) public sector social enterprises (PSSE); (2) 
entrepreneurial non-proits (ENP); (3) social co-operatives 
(SC); and (4) social businesses (SB). This research draws 
heavily on Spear et al. (2009) who irst outlined these four 
types. Bull (2015), however, challenges the concept of PSSE 
because each SE is constituted through one of the other legal 
forms. Put simply, all PSSEs choose between CTA, CME 
or SRB enterprise orientations (so we represent PSSEs in 
Table 1 as spanning the other three choices). This reading 
of the literature concurs with earlier work by Westall (2001) 
and Cornforth (2003) who also saw three conigurations that 
align with the same distinctive SE types (CTAs, CMEs and 
SRBs).
Based on this review, we settle on three conigurations of 
hybridity (highlighted in grey in Table 1). In the next sec-
tion, we focus on the rationalities and ethical propositions of 
these three types. We irstly position ourselves in relation to 
the literature on business ethics, then set out the diferences 
between formal, substantive and social rationality. We argue 
that each rationality changes the criteria for making moral 
choices, leading to divergent ethical commitments that inlu-
ence each approach to SE.
Ethics and Rationality
Business ethics is a contested ield polarised between those 
that seek to prescribe and describe ethics and those that see 
little value in studying it at all (Parker 1998a, b). Parker 
(1998a, b) contends that academic study of ethics cannot 
escape prescriptions of various ‘authorities’ by turning its 
attention to the ‘more solid terrain of description’ because 
there is no consensus about the nature of being. Faced with 
the conundrum of not being able to reach a consensus on 
what it is to be ethical, Parker points to the ‘turn’ in the 
works of Derrida, Foucault, Giddens and Habermas on the 
way social norms impact judgment. This foregrounds epis-
temology, ways of knowing, to give rise to the study of busi-
ness ethics as a study of the political ‘foundations’ on which 
ethical commitments are socially constructed.
Parker’s assumptions are challenged by Anthony (1998) 
who contends that business ethics does not derive from 
the on-high proclamations of political institutions but out 
of everyday interactions between workers and managers. 
He cites Selznick’s (1992, p. 19) view that moral choices 
‘are not elements of an external ethic brought to the world 
like a Promethean ire. They are generated by mundane 
needs, practical opportunities and felt satisfactions’. Based 
on Selznick’s statement, we contend that social enterprise 
development, indeed all business development, is rooted in 
everyday moral choices, satisfactions and opportunities we 
seek for ourselves and others, and our choice of whether 
to direct our own labour or allow others to direct it for us. 
These starting points are shown in Fig. 2.
Rhodes et al. (2010a, b, p. 536) claim that it is possible to 
establish empirically that ‘“ethics in practice” [is] embed-
ded in the mundane activities of organising and managing’. 
The ‘organising’ and ‘managing’ that interests us are those 
that social entrepreneurs generate through their SEs as they 
confront dilemmas in their relationships with others (Wray-
Bliss 2009). We have circled these in Fig. 2: (1) motiva-
tions to help others to help oneself; (2) the desire to help 
others without exploiting oneself, and; (3) the motivation to 
self-direct one’s own eforts to help others. As Wray-Bliss 
(2009) sets out, critical ethics arises out of relecting on the 
impact of our relationships with others, our responses to 
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their demands, the extent to which we distant ourselves from 
them or, alternatively, feel a sense of responsibility to or for 
them.
Before we can build on Fig. 2, we need to set out our 
views on three rationalities (formal, substantive and 
social) and discuss how they link to our choice of SE theo-
ries (Table 1). Barinaga (2013) challenges SE scholars to 
acknowledge the political implications of social entrepre-
neurial rationalities. We do this by going beyond Barinaga’s 
choices (economic, discursive and community) to consider 
the political and philosophical origins of formal, substantive 
and social rationality.
Formal rationality was advanced by Weber (1978, p. 
656) as a ‘logically clear, internally consistent, and, at least 
in theory, gapless system of rules’ that provides the legal 
foundations for advanced societies. Within this system, deci-
sion-making is intended to proceed based on predictability, 
applying logic to derive abstract principles that bring about 
consistency when making judgements. Moreover, these 
abstract principles are enforced through the application of 
rules based on predetermined judgement criteria (Feldman 
1991). Legal frameworks based on formal rationality are 
necessarily controlled by an elite. Weber argued that (when 
making decisions) it was best to exclude ‘external inter-
ference’ on the basis that it could corrupt the process of 
applying abstract principles in the interpretation of rules. As 
Shamir (1993) notes, this led Weber to devalue knowledge 
derived from practice. Weber not only favoured a scholarly 
approach to rule making, but also that the resulting rules 
should be enforced in a way that shielded rule enforcers 
from the inluence of others (particularly those engaged in 
practice).
A clear link with Weber’s formal rationality persists 
today in ‘best practice’ guidelines adopted by charities and 
related hybrid SEs with top-down approaches to governance. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, private sector guidance 
on corporate governance reinforced the idea that gover-
nors and executives should protect their independence by 
favouring outside directors and trustees. Within this system, 
employees who are hired to enact the rules have little or no 
part to play in making them, whilst senior managers and 
trustees/directors make and enforce them. Whilst Weber 
distinguished ‘rigid’ and ‘logical’ applications of formal 
rationality (Shamir 1993), he sought to avoid alternative 
rationalities that considered ‘ethical imperatives, utilitarian 
and other expediential rules and political maxims’ (Weber 
1978, p. 657).
This alternative, which he regarded as substantive ration-
ality, eventually came to the fore in the USA when Dewey, 
Pierce, James, Holmes and Gray supported the New Deal in 
the 1930s (Shamir 1993). This challenged the dominance 
of formal rationality by attacking the privileged position of 
scholarly elites and capital owners. It also provided a way 
for democrats to challenge the normative inluence of for-
mal rationality which concealed ‘the unequal distribution of 
economic and political power […] behind a veil of objective 
science’ (ibid., p. 49).
Substantive rationality difers through its focus on the 
goals of rational actors and the environment in which they 
are realised (Simons, 1978). In place of abstract principles 
decided a priori by an elite, substantive rationality focuses 
on contextually appropriate decision-making in each envi-
ronment. As Shamir (1993) points out, Weber eschewed 
this type of rationality as the basis for a legal system. In 
doing so, he failed to appreciate the value of substantive 
rationality for studies of goal-directed entrepreneurs. More 
broadly, the logics of substantive rationality present a chal-
lenge to the idea that a universally applicable system of rules 
based on formal rationality can produce ethical outcomes in 
practice, because social contexts and norms vary so widely. 
Fig. 2  A matrix of everyday 
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Substantive rationality would hold that the best decisions 
are local, not universal, and that a range of decisions may 
be adequate for a given situation. The ‘best’ decisions will 
also vary across time and space.
Connecting substantive rationality to social entrepre-
neurship is straightforward because the latter is rooted in 
an action-orientated approach to revealing, reframing and 
challenging inequitable distributions of power and wealth 
in a speciic community (Martin and Osberg 2007). Moral 
judgements rest on whether the motivations of social entre-
preneurs are practically adequate for a given context. For 
example, the moral claim that Yunus’s (2007) concept of 
social business is ‘better’ is based on the practical adequacy 
of the Grameen Bank’s role in mitigating rural poverty in 
Bangladesh. Justiication does not depend on an appeal to 
precedents and a priori abstract principles, but on the out-
comes achieved for people. As Shamir (1993) describes, 
this aligns substantive rationality with pragmatism because 
ethics are made and remade in the context of practice—
the ‘mundane’ everyday decisions referred to by Anthony 
(1998), not a priori abstract reasoning advanced by Weber. 
Seen in this light, social entrepreneurship is the application 
of pragmatism rooted in the substantive rationality of the 
social entrepreneur. It is triggered and sustained by sensitiv-
ity to local political and social issues, and its ethical salience 
is linked to the outcomes achieved.
The criticism that pragmatism promotes expediency 
rather than ethical behaviour (based on Weber’s notion of 
abstract principles) is rejected by Haack (1976, p. 232) on 
the basis that counter-arguments depend on an ‘inadequate 
understanding of the theory [of pragmatism]’. Critics place 
too much emphasis on pragmatism’s ‘practical utility’ cri-
terion and ignore its stated commitments to coherence and 
correspondence with an objective reality. Haack (1976) 
defends pragmatism by arguing that formally rational sys-
tems cannot sustain ethical outcomes in practice because 
rules abstracted from reality (i.e. that neither correspond 
to nor are coherent with local realities) have less practical 
utility because they are less able to accommodate (and be 
responsive to) the moral choices that occur in diferent social 
contexts.
Our view, however, is that both formal and substantive 
rationality are vulnerable to the criticism made by Simons 
(1978) that they are blind to the discipline of (social) psy-
chology. Whilst substantive rationality might account for the 
‘learning by doing’ approach of individual social entrepre-
neurs, it cannot account for SEs that emerge from collective 
action. We need a more critical ethics (Wray-Bliss 2009, p. 
273) to wrestle with ‘the multitude of unique met and unmet 
others, each of which have the same call upon [us]’. The 
ield of SE does not just concern itself with products and 
services, but also the contribution of SEs to the quality of 
human relationships within a community. It is for this reason 
that international deinitions and laws identify the need for 
governance systems that enable people afected by decisions 
to contribute to making them (Defourny and Nyssens 2016; 
Restakis 2010; Ridley-Duf 2015). Moreover, Laville and 
Nyssens (2001) have long argued that one of the primary 
‘products’ of SE is social, not economic, capital. Creating 
the social capital that sustains a community requires the 
establishment of social networks where relationship quality 
improves and levels of trust increase.
The rationality that applies in this case is social, not sub-
stantive (Ridley-Duf 2008; Ridley-Duf and Bull 2016). 
Social rationality occurs when decision-making is guided 
by considerations of whether to form, develop or maintain 
relationships for their own sake (rather than an instrumen-
tal purpose). From a socially rational perspective, decisions 
would be taken (or not taken) based on whether the person 
making the decision wanted to disrupt or preserve friend-
ship networks, business relationships and family ties. In 
terms of its ethics, it is the rationality closest to critical eth-
ics. It concerns itself wholly with the relationship between 
selves and others (Wray-Bliss 2009), and the rationales we 
develop for more intimate or more distant relationships. 
Social rationality, therefore, is qualitatively diferent to for-
mal and substantive rationality in that decisions are made 
based on their potential to shape, change, preserve or end 
social relationships.
The connection to CMEs is easy to make through an 
examination of its guiding principles. Six of the seven co-
operative principles (open membership, democratic control, 
economic participation, autonomy, inter-cooperation and 
concern for community; see Birchall 2012) guide relation-
ships rather than missions, products or services. They guide 
the relationships between individual members, members 
and their enterprise, and between their enterprises and the 
wider community. The relationship focus can appear in the 
mission statements of co-operatives. For example, Seward 
Community Co-operative’s website suggests they commit 
to ‘sustaining a healthy community that has: equitable eco-
nomic relationships, positive environmental impacts and 
inclusive, socially responsible practices’. The principles 
establish a norm of thinking about the social aspects of 
organising, tackling social exclusion and promoting com-
munity participation (associational life) as an integral part 
of business (see Scott-Cato et al. 2008).
We can link these three rationalities to SE business mod-
els. In CTAs, the commitment to social or charitable aims 
dominates. The legal framework requires trustees/directors 
to take decisions that advance speciic ‘objects’. This not 
only accounts for Cornforth’s ‘Compliance’/‘rubber stamp’ 
governance mode and Agency Theory for command and 
control, it also inclines trustees/directors towards formal 
rationality (framed by utilitarian ethics). Trustees/directors 
of charities, in law, are judged as having a conlict of interest 
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if they combine practice (working) with trusteeship (govern-
ing). In Weberian terms, trustees/directors are scholar and 
judge—deciding the rules under which others will operate 
and then enforcing them. If they work amongst those gov-
erned by the rules, it will corrupt their moral duty to enforce 
the rule system. Wray-Bliss (2009) would likely frame this 
as an ethical rule to ‘keep your distance’ (from others). 
Based on the arguments of Shamir (1993) and Anthony 
(1998), we contend that this illustrates why Weberian eth-
ics produces poor ethical outcomes—it is not sensitive or 
responsive to the moral dilemmas of practice.
The charitable model, therefore, is premised on one group 
of value holders/generators undertaking activities for others, 
ostensibly helping those unable to help themselves within 
a governance system that requires they keep their distance 
(Westall 2001). According to The Code Founding Group 
(2010)—a body representing Association of Chief Execu-
tives of Voluntary Organisations (ACEVO), Charity Trustee 
Network and National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO) (amongst others)—the six principles for good 
charity governance are: (1) understand the role; (2) delivery 
of purpose; (3) work efectively as a team and individual; 
(4) control; (5) integrity; and (6) be open and accountable. 
These six characteristics align well with compliance/rubber 
stamp board theory (Cornforth 2003), where safeguarding 
(integrity), checking practice against rules (accountability) 
and ratifying decisions (control) are considered the role 
of the board. Not surprisingly, this commitment to formal 
rationality and the separation of board and executive led 
Spear et al. (2009) to conclude that these types of SEs tend 
to lack an enterprise culture. To the extent that philanthropic 
governance retains a Weberian commitment to formal ration-
ality, it will likely incline its practitioners towards bureau-
cratic processes controlled by an elite (the trustee board). 
The commitment to formal rationality also represents an 
ethical position that social/charitable purpose(s) (particu-
larly under statutory law) requires performance manage-
ment against predetermined criteria, judged by a regulatory 
authority against charitable objects.
In CMEs, the member-owned, controlled and governed 
model can be aligned with Cornforth’s (2003) democratic 
model (see Table 1). At the heart of this is a strong ori-
entation towards relationships through open membership, 
inclusive/democratic governance, economic democracy, 
participatory management and—in its most radical imple-
mentations—wage solidarity. The dominant rationalities are 
social (in governance) and substantive (regarding the social, 
economic and cultural needs of members). The democratic 
ideology of CMEs is rooted in one-person, one-vote system 
that usurps the formal rationality envisaged by Weber by dis-
solving the divide between rule-makers and rule-followers. 
As members, the ‘governed’ make the rules by which ‘to 
govern’, as well as ‘be’ governed. This is not the case in 
charities and charitable foundations where rule-makers are 
appointed and do not experience the efects of their own rule 
making. (They make rules for others.)
Governance in CMEs is internalised because members of 
the organisation (whether workers or users) design ‘closed-
loop’ systems for electing their boards (Turnbull 2001). The 
ethical emphasis shifts to ‘self-help’ by afording members 
scope to vary their ‘objects’ in democratic assemblies. As 
they can set objects without reference to a higher authority, 
the orientation is towards substantive, not formal, rationality. 
However, democratic decision-making may still be subject 
to formally rationality at the level of process.
In SRBs, there are governance models aligned with Corn-
forth’s ‘Agency’ model (Table 1). Cornforth states that in 
this model, the principal agent (the entrepreneur) has difer-
ent interests to those that work in the organisation. There-
fore, an element of control, compliance and monitoring goes 
on. Whilst the entrepreneur could enforce this through for-
mally rational systems, their own ethics (rather than the eth-
ics implied by statutory objects) shifts the decision-making 
process towards substantive rationality. Entrepreneurs give 
pragmatic consideration to their previous experience and 
make decisions based on their own value system (Coase 
1937). As Ridley-Duf and Bull (2016) state, one element 
of SRBs is a focus on innovation, which is strongest in the 
US literature where the value propositions of social entre-
preneurs are taken as the drivers of social change (Fried-
man and Desivilya 2010; Light 2008). This focus on inno-
vation (particularly in the use of private sector inancial 
instruments) is also a feature of Yunus’s (2007) argument 
for ‘social business’. Yunus sets out two hybrid ‘types’ that 
both have substantively rational goals (i.e. the elimination 
of poverty). Yunus’s irst type adopts the characteristics of 
an SRB in which there are locks on both assets and proits. 
Yunus argues vigorously for equity instruments and arrange-
ments that enable investors to recover their investment. To 
this end, he sees a need for a social investment industry to 
make capital available and establish the metrics that social 
investors need to make judgements about which investments 
produce the greatest social returns (Nicholls 2010). Whilst 
there is scope for an investment industry driven by formally 
rationality, this mode of thinking is restricted to the way 
investment is provided, not the social goals of the entre-
preneur (who continues to exercise substantive rationality 
consistent their own ethical commitments).
In summary, this section has brought together diferent 
conceptualisations of SE and elaborated how formal, sub-
stantive and social rationality are applied to organise and 
manage activities. We compared the conceptualisations in 
Table 1 to present enterprise orientations across three hybrid 
types of SE that align with particular trajectories, forms of 
incorporation, types of governance, management ideolo-
gies and historical foundations. We now switch attention to 
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theorising the links between these ethical outputs (types of 
SE) and underlying ethical inputs (motivations to act).
Motivations, Individual Actions 
and Organisational Ethos
In this section, we link motivations to act (Fig. 2) with SE 
types (Table 1) and their linkages to diferent rationalities. 
A distinction can be made between the person who directs 
actions and the beneiciary of the actions that are directed. 
Individualist philosophy can vary between the presumed 
self-interest that underpins entrepreneurial action ‘I’ll direct 
my efort towards helping myself’ and the willingness of 
self-interested individuals to join together and engage in col-
lective action for self-beneit ‘I’ll help you to beneit myself’ 
(Coase 1937; Parnell 2011; Smith 1937 [1776]). Whilst 
contemporary culture is replete with images of aggressive 
action by individual entrepreneurs (in popular programmes 
like The Apprentice), Parnell (2011, p. 8), the former CEO 
of the Plunkett Foundation, contends that action directed 
by self-interest can also be organised jointly: ‘An impor-
tant feature of the co-operative approach is its acceptance 
of people [who are] largely driven by self-interest. It also 
acknowledges that most people are unlikely to modify their 
self-centred behaviour without a suicient incentive to do 
so […]. Co-operation recognises that self-centred behaviour 
can be moderated when a more enlightened form of self-
interest takes account of the wider mutual interest’.
For Parnell, collectivism is not always motivated by altru-
istic intent (even if altruism is the outcome). Instead, collec-
tive action, and the desire to work with others co-operatively, 
can still be motivated by the desire for individualised ben-
eits. Examples of this can be found in trade unionism and 
mutual insurance schemes where individuals join to protect 
themselves but concurrently protect others through regular 
subscriptions of inancial capital that are paid out on the 
basis of need.
On altruistic action (i.e. actions that are motivated by a 
deliberate intent to help others, not the self), there is a range 
of underpinning logics from entrepreneurial self-directed 
action ‘I’ll direct my eforts towards helping others’ to work-
ing under the direction of an institution or authority (such 
a charity or public body) seeking to create a public beneit 
‘I’ll help you to beneit others’ (see Fig. 2). However, our 
argument here is that few people exist at the extremes of 
these axes. Equity theory (Huseman et al. 1987; Kilbourne 
and O’Leary-Kelly 1994) posits that people prefer balanced 
beneits in which neither individuals nor social groups are 
over or under compensated for their eforts ‘I’ll help others 
without exploiting myself, and share any beneits received 
with others’.
The theoretical underpinnings of these positions are 
elaborated in Fig. 3. The two-by-two matrix is re-divided 
into three-by-three matrix with nine orientations. The irst 
dimension (across the top) is theorised using Polanyi’s work 
on modes of economic exchange: redistribution, reciproc-
ity and market (Evers 1995; Nyssens 2006; Pestof 1998; 
Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Roy 2015). Importantly, Pestof (2005) 
suggests this ‘welfare mix’ encapsulates a diversity of hybrid 
logics (beyond mission and market) and considers the actors 
involved.
Redistributive actions seek to move resources from one 
setting to another in accordance with pre-agreed political 
and social priorities. This logic is used by governments, 
public authorities and charities that raise funds (or taxes) 
from one source and redistribute them to others who cre-
ate public goods/services. Reciprocity, on the other hand, 
is grounded in the logic of mutual aid, whereby equita-
ble contributions to, and drawings from, mutual funds 
Fig. 3  Mapping ethical ethos 
against motivations
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generate both individual and collective beneits (Ostrom 
et al. 1999; Restakis 2010). In this case, action is focused 
on securing reciprocal exchanges, counter gifts and culti-
vating a willingness amongst people with familial, kinship 
or community ties to proactively support each other’s well-
being. As Pestof (2005) suggests, reciprocity is difer-
ent to redistribution. Reciprocal action is conducted via a 
network of human relationships practising social rational-
ity whilst redistributive action operates through a central 
authority pursuing formal (and perhaps also substantive) 
rationality.
The last type of economic exchange is through the mar-
ket. Exchange is still the goal, but the mediating mechanism 
is no longer the social rationality of kinship, community ties 
or personal bonds. It is replaced by a depersonalised system 
of commodity production with buying and selling goods 
mediated by transaction costs that are variously inlated (by 
the seller) to increase the amount of proit or reduced (by 
the buyer) to minimise losses (Coase 1937). The more mar-
ket transactions are for private beneit (i.e. a single goal of 
proit-maximisation or utility), the more they incline towards 
systems of substantive rationality (of the consumer) and 
formal rationality (of the inancier). Where market transac-
tions are for social beneit (i.e. intended to have a dual goal 
of wealth sharing and impact on the community), they will 
reorient towards social and substantive rationality.
The second axis (down the left-hand side) is theorised 
using works on social value orientation (the propensity 
and inclination of a person to help others). The concepts 
deployed here are drawn from studies of altruism rather than 
modes of economic exchange (Dreu and Boles 1998). The 
concepts distinguish a person who is individualistic (egocen-
tric), co-operative or philanthropic (pro-social). The term 
individualistic is applied to a person who thinks only of their 
own beneit (egocentric), whereas the term philanthropic is 
applied to a person who thinks only of the beneit to others 
(pro-social).
What is the ethos behind each of the positions on the 
grid and the enterprise types in each space? As can be seen 
in Fig. 3, the top left space implies a public service ethos 
that guides philanthropic and redistributive action (Pratchett 
and Wingield 1996). As we are concerned with SE, this 
orientation is omitted in the igures hereafter. In the opposite 
corner (bottom right, Figs. 3, 4) is a private enterprise ethos 
built on individualistic and market principles, outlined in 
Smith’s ‘The Wealth of Nations’ (Smith 1937 [1776]). This 
orientation is also omitted from igures hereafter as this does 
not lead to SE either. That leaves an alternative dimension 
(starting bottom left, Fig. 3). Community action is redis-
tributive, but with an individualistic ethos. In Smith’s ‘Moral 
Sentiments’ (1790), he identiies the personal beneits of 
caring for others. Where the orientation is individualistic or 
co-operative, the enterprise orientations range from charita-
ble associations (more pro-social) to community association, 
then to more personal beneits from collective action in trade 
and credit unions (Fig. 4). These can lead to SE organised 
as CTAs supported by a statutory or social framework of 
charitable objects. Formal rationality is still dominant, but 
can be moderated by social rationality.
In the opposite corner (top right, Fig. 3) is Martin and 
Osberg’s (2007) idea of social entrepreneurs as ‘dynamic 
individuals’ with a market-based pro-social ethos. This 
orientation in social entrepreneurship leads to SE, par-
ticularly through SRBs (but including industrial and retail 
co-operatives as well as Yunus type 1 social businesses). 
In SRBs, social entrepreneurs are guided by their own, 
rather than a statutorily controlled set of social priorities, 
oriented towards pragmatism and substantial rationality. 
Where industrial co-operatives form or emerge (Owen 2014 
[1816]), the social rationality of members starts to moderate 
Fig. 4  Mapping enterprise 
orientations and forms
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the substantive rationality of founders, and over time this 
will increase where governance systems yield power to a 
sovereign assembly of member-owners (see Whyte and 
Whyte 1991).
Lastly (Fig. 3, centre) is Ostrom’s (1990) research on col-
lective action based on the economics of reciprocity and 
co-operative social values. The orientation of co-operatives 
and mutual societies is based on the ethos of sharing ben-
eits, not to keep them all to oneself or give them all away 
(Ridley-Duf 2007, 2008). The primary concern is produc-
tive social relations rather than ‘objects’ so the dominant 
rationality is social, rather than formal or substantive. The 
enterprise orientations that prevail here are co-operative 
societies, mutual enterprises, community businesses and 
member- or employee-led businesses (Fig. 4). There is a 
balance to be struck between community and individualistic 
orientations here, so Fig. 3 also shows Arizmendiarietta’s 
co-operativism (Whyte and Whyte 1991), in which indi-
vidual capital accounts exist alongside indivisible reserves 
within the Mondragon co-operative network in Spain.
In this section, we relected on the philosophical motiva-
tions that guide individual and collective action. In mapping 
concepts, we linked motivations to act (inputs) against ethos 
(outputs) within a 3 × 3 matrix (Fig. 3). We now link our 
framework more irmly to enterprise orientations (Fig. 4) 
before identifying the ethical theories and rationalities that 
support each SE business model (Fig. 5).
Switching the Axis‑Ethical Theories 
of Philosophies of Action
At this point, it is worth emphasising how our analysis is 
shaping our argument for an appreciation of ethics in the 
theorisation of SE. Figure 4 brings to the fore how enterprise 
orientations can be mapped onto motivations for individual 
and collective action. The dominant paradigm is one that 
sees the world through a lens that runs from the top left to 
the bottom right—public–social–private (showing a choice 
between a public service orientation, social and private 
economy). We posit that this runs from an altruistic commu-
nitarian ideology through to a neoliberal ideology (Fig. 5). 
Ethical theory in SE to date has principally been framed 
through this mission-market lens on the basis that SE arises 
out of the commercialisation of non-proits. As Figs. 4 and 
5 show, this is crudely reductionist and fails to account for 
the diversity of motives, missions and legal forms in the 
ield of SE.
SE is more than a single organisational and ethical type. 
By switching the framing, we ofer another axis from bottom 
left to top right that shows three alternative hybrids (asso-
ciative–cooperative–responsible) within the SE discourse 
(Figs. 4, 5). This exposes the ‘deep back’ and its multiple 
connections to ethical theory. On this alternative axis, the 
ideology is one of social liberalism (bottom left) through 
communitarian pluralism (middle) to pragmatic communi-
tarianism (top right).
We now take each in turn. Social liberalism difers from 
neoliberalism through its greater emphasis on human, 
social and political (rather than economic) rights. Whilst 
the focus is still on the protection of individual rights and 
freedoms, the emphasis switches to freedoms beyond the 
marketplace—freedom of thought, speech and associa-
tion. CTAs (Fig. 4, bottom left) seek to protect these by 
engaging in non-proit income generating activities that 
redistribute resources through associations and societies. 
Some altruistic action can be directed towards commu-
nity beneit, maximising happiness for members and their 
host communities, and through economic exchanges that 
redistribute to those in greatest need, guided by utilitar-
ian ethics (Fig. 5). Social liberalism may or may not have 
state support, but in either case it remains a vehicle for 
Fig. 5  Mapping ethics within 
social enterprise groups
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the redistribution and promotion of power, wealth and 
voice amongst a group of individuals. It can beneit from 
statutory support where this provides legal frameworks 
for its development. Social liberalism that is redistributive 
through either community or charitable associations still 
favours the formal rationality of charitable goals (Fig. 5), 
in which members commit to ‘objects’ and deploy a 
means-ends rationality to achieve them (Weber 1978). The 
legal and cultural frameworks here are charitable objects 
(under charity or non-proit law) or social objects (under 
community interest or community beneit society law).
A philosophy of communitarian pluralism leverages the 
power of individual freedom of thought, speech and associa-
tion to reach collective agreements on mutual beneits for 
the members of a socio-economic enterprise (Ridley-Duf 
2007). CMEs (Fig. 4, middle) incorporate their commitment 
to social rationality and mutual exchange through CMEs. 
The result intended (if not always fully realised) is an active 
inclusive democratic system of governance (Borzaga and 
Depredi 2014). These enterprises deploy both market and 
non-market trading strategies and can combine non-proit 
or for-proit principles to distribute beneits equitably to 
members and/or host communities. They combine member-
ownership and/or member-control with trading that provides 
a mix of member and public beneits. Within CMEs, plural-
ism is more fully realised in social and solidarity co-ops 
(Defourny and Nyssens 2016; Ridley-Duf 2015) because 
their structures are more open and inclusive than single-
stakeholder co-ops and share beneits more widely across a 
community (Fig. 4). Thus, there are both unitary and plu-
ralist forms of communitarianism (more unitary in worker/
consumer co-ops and more pluralist in multi-stakeholder co-
ops that enfranchise workers, customers and investors/sup-
porters). Hence, whilst the middle ground is fully realised 
by multi-stakeholder co-operativism, there are ‘of-centre’ 
forms that err towards more unitary governance logics (com-
munity businesses) or towards socially liberal forms of indi-
vidual ownership (e.g. directly employee-owned businesses) 
(Fig. 4). Social rationality in CMEs is played out where 
members collectively decide on the beneits that matter at 
a particular point in time, and where the quality of human 
relationships (rather than charitable or social ‘objects’) is the 
dominant frame of reference (Fig. 5).
Social rationality (Ridley-Duf 2008), therefore, produces 
a diferent business model in which ‘good’ decision-making 
is measured and assessed in terms of member participation 
in determining objects that are relevant now, rather than 
ixed. Whilst there can be substantive rationality operating 
through a responsiveness to members and the community, 
where the social rationality of members dominates the sub-
stantive rationality of social entrepreneurs, there is a mem-
ber and community orientation, rather than a market logic, 
dominating moral choices (Fig. 5).
Pragmatic communitarianism is more market-oriented 
and gives greater consideration to ‘what works’ in terms of 
utility and public beneit. SRBs (Fig. 4, top right) incorpo-
rate approaches to market exchange-based trading activi-
ties that proactively pursue sustainable development goals 
(Defourny and Nyssens 2016). Activities are self-directed by 
those seeking to bring about a public or community beneit. 
As SRBs, they are in a stronger position to take advantage of 
existing market institutions and its ideological rules. It leads 
to business models under the control of a single (or small 
group of) social entrepreneurs who purport to help others. 
Whilst utilitarian ethics (the best outcome for the greatest 
number of people) may prevail, this is a more pragmatic 
form of communitarianism driven by change makers and 
social activists (Yunus 2007). The arbiters of social value are 
social entrepreneurs operating in a community context, and 
it is their moral choices that are favoured, rather than those 
democratically agreed in an association or co-operative. As 
a result, the dominant rationality is substantive, rather than 
social or formal (Fig. 5).
In our central column of CMEs, diferent rationalities 
can be combined, but the ethical rules for establishing and 
operating collective SEs are premised on social rationality 
as an end it itself. In CTAs and SRBs, social rationality is 
the means (i.e. relationships between people are organised 
to pursue a social outcome or secure a inancial proit). In 
contrast, within CMEs purpose is the means, (i.e. the pur-
pose is chosen to (re)build a community of people). This 
aligns with previous research evidence that it does not mat-
ter what a company/enterprise does so long as the result 
is a cohesive community that advances human well-being 
(Laville and Nyssens 2001; Ridley-Duf 2015). As Scott-
Cato et al. (2008) argued, academic debate on the deinition 
of the social economy depends on organising principles, not 
on the purpose(s) or market in which the enterprise operates.
To summarise, we have achieved our objective of criti-
cally analysing entrepreneurial intentions in SE from an 
alternative perspective. We now turn our attention to the 
research question and our contribution. In our conclusions, 
we address the question ‘How can a critical analysis of 
entrepreneurial intention inform an appreciation of ethics 
in social enterprise business models?’.
Conclusions
We present social enterprise ethics as the rule systems that 
emerge from social entrepreneurial choices to hybridise 
redistribution, reciprocity and market exchange in pursuit 
of pro-social, mutualised and individualised outcomes. This 
challenges the dominant conceptualisation of SE as a hybrid 
blend of mission and market dichotomy (purpose-versus-
resource) by reframing hybridity in terms of the moral 
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choice of economic system (redistribution, reciprocity and 
market) and social value orientation (personal, mutual or 
public beneit). We have deconstructed the political founda-
tions, ethical commitments and outcomes of CTAs, CMEs 
and SRBs by examining the rationalities (formal, social and 
substantive) that underpin them, and interpreted how this 
afects the way moral choices are enacted and enforced. 
Whilst conceptual modelling of SE is not new, this paper 
contributes to knowledge by developing a theory of social 
enterprise ethics based on the moral/political choices that are 
made by entrepreneurs (knowingly and unknowingly) when 
choosing between systems of economic exchange, legal form 
and social value orientation.
Having reviewed the literature and looked at the distinc-
tions between SE hybrid forms (Alter 2007; Conaty 2001; 
Cornforth 2003; Dees 1998; Westall 2001), we draw on con-
ceptual models that grapple with SE identities (community 
interest companies, trading charities, co-operatives, mutuals, 
community beneit societies). We argue that the framing of 
hybridity to date only addresses the ‘ethical front’ of SE—its 
rhetorical appeal. Our paper ofers a substantive analysis of 
new thinking on hybridisation linked to alternative framings 
of the ield to explore its ‘deep back’ (Bull 2015; Defourny 
and Nyssens 2016; Ridley-Duf and Bull 2016). We paid 
attention to the diferent framing of means and ends that 
occurs when social rationality dominates moral choices 
in the context of cooperative action. We clarify the moral 
choices made when coniguring a SE by pinpointing ethical 
diferences between hybrids. We pinpoint the foundations of 
diferent enterprise orientations, moving the debate on SE 
away from a public–private dichotomy to one that builds an 
alternative perspective rooted in associative, cooperative and 
responsible social entrepreneurship.
Firstly, having considered current conceptualisations of 
SE we outline the diferences between types at the level of 
ethical inputs and outputs. Secondly, we highlight signiicant 
diferences between the rationalities and ethical commit-
ments and bring them together into a coherent meta-theory. 
This paper ills a void by drawing together prior research on 
spectrum models to highlight the swing from philanthropic 
to commercial enterprise orientations and business mod-
els. We build on this in our third contribution by creating a 
matrix to support our argument that switching from a public-
social-private mindset to one based on associative-cooper-
ative-responsible practices better captures the rationalities 
and ethical propositions of diferent orientations in SE.
We have responded to Ogbor’s (2000, p. 620) challenge to 
question; ‘how and why particular ideational systems, insti-
tutions and belief systems produce and shape the pattern 
of entrepreneurship in contemporary society’. We did this 
by opening up a diferent axis of thought that ranges from 
socially liberal forms of charitable and community asso-
ciation, undertaking CTAs, through more pluralist forms of 
cooperation and mutuality in CMEs, to the pragmatic com-
munitarianism of ‘dynamic’ social entrepreneurs in SRBs. 
We also acknowledge and build on the scholarly contri-
butions from Copenhagen Business School (see Barinaga 
2013; Hjorth 2013) by connecting rationalities to entrepre-
neurial intentions and legal form, then opening the space for 
a greater consideration of the ‘social’ in public entrepreneur-
ship and entrepreneurial discourses. Our theory links to and 
explicates how alternatives to the dominant public/private 
(mission-market) discourse are rooted in collectivist, partici-
patory and activist traditions of (social) enterprise creation 
(Daskalaki et al. 2015). We ofer a theory of the way motiva-
tions drive individual and collective action, change the way 
we respond to the social challenges of meeting our needs, 
satisfying our wants and advancing practice, and thereby 
produce distinctive systems of social enterprise ethics.
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